Microsoft Security Response Center guidance
Vendor revision: Nov 21, 2026Release Notes
Vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-99773. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.
Release Notes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind
In [1], sashiko reported the following issue:
=== snip === Looking at how these fences are managed, drm_crtc_create_fence() creates a dma_fence without taking a reference to the drm_device or drm_crtc. Because the sync_file framework exposes this fence to userspace, the fence can outlive the CRTC.
The dma_fence contract requires that data accessed by dma_fence_ops (like get_driver_name) must remain valid for an RCU grace period after the fence is signaled. However, drm_crtc_cleanup() and the subsequent freeing of the device do not wait for an RCU grace period via synchronize_rcu().
If userspace calls ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) concurrently with a device hot-unplug:
CPU1 (Userspace) sync_file_get_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops); if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) // Preempted or delayed here
CPU2 (Driver Teardown) Signals the fence (setting fence->ops = NULL) Destroys and frees the CRTC without waiting for an RCU grace period
CPU1 (Resumes) ops->get_driver_name(fence) -> drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() crtc = fence_to_crtc(fence); // Casts to the freed CRTC return crtc->dev->driver->name; // Use-after-free
...
Does the CRTC or DRM device need to be kept alive for the RCU grace period, or should the fence hold a proper reference to prevent the use-after-free when get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() access the freed CRTC structure? === snap ===
I believe this to be a correct observation and this patch implements the suggestion of waiting for an RCU grace period before proceeding with destruction of the drm_crtc, so that get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() can still work.
Source: NVD