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CVE intelligence

CVE-2026-99542

Vulnerability intelligence

Published Nov 19, 2026Sources checked Nov 21, 2026
N/ACVSS not listedScore unavailable
What this means

Review the available evidence

CVE-2026-99542. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.

What to do next

Remediation and response

Microsoft Security Response Center guidance

Vendor revision: Nov 21, 2026

Release Notes

CISA KEVNot listedBased on the latest collected catalog
EPSS0.2%Estimated 30-day exploitation probability
Ransomware useNot markedCISA KEV ransomware field
Threat actors0Source-linked actor relationships
Overview

What is CVE-2026-99542?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request

smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2 CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5).

The empty-DACL branch only denies when both

- the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)), and - the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.

In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0, which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants the full requested access. Three problems follow:

- The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them.

- A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL.

- A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes (pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is granted whatever was requested.

On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g. "force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass.

Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.

Source: NVD