Microsoft Security Response Center guidance
Vendor revision: Nov 20, 2026Release Notes
Vendor-listed releases
- 0:6.18.62-1.1.azl4
Vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-99239 and is rated High severity with a CVSS score of 7.8. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.
Release Notes
Vendor-listed releases
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.
There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:
[Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) chan->state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND lock_sock <------------------ release_sock sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second __l2cap_chan_add.
Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so there can be other TOCTOUC problems.
Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
Source: NVD