CVE-2026-98989

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops

do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from.

With MS_REC everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are copied.

That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was bind-mounted.

It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace. may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns> and pidfds can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces file descriptors the kernel will copy them irrespective of their ancestoral relationship to the mount namespace in question:

151 146 0:7 net:[4026531833] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw 152 151 0:7 mnt:[4026532293] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw

Mount 152 is a mount of the mount namespace file of mount namespace 4026532293 inside mount namespace 4026532293. That namespace and every mount in it are leaked...

All it takes is a process in an older mount namespace that stacks the file and repeating it leaks without limit:

after control: Shmem: 380 kB child: mount(/proc/self/fd/6, MS_BIND|MS_REC): ok after cycle: Shmem: 65916 kB

do_move_mount() runs check_for_nsfs_mounts() over a detached tree for exactly that reason. Do the same for the copy before it is grafted.