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CVE-2026-98464

Vulnerability intelligence

Published Oct 18, 2026Sources checked Oct 21, 2026
N/ACVSS not listedScore unavailable
What this means

Review the available evidence

CVE-2026-98464. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.

What to do next

Remediation and response

Microsoft Security Response Center guidance

Vendor revision: Oct 20, 2026

Release Notes

CISA KEVNot listedBased on the latest collected catalog
EPSS0.2%Estimated 30-day exploitation probability
Ransomware useNot markedCISA KEV ransomware field
Threat actors0Source-linked actor relationships
Overview

What is CVE-2026-98464?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RISC-V: KVM: Synchronize hrtimer callback during teardown

The non-Sstc hrtimer callback clears next_set before its final uses of the enclosing vCPU. If teardown observes next_set as false while the callback is still running, kvm_riscv_vcpu_timer_cancel() skips hrtimer_cancel() and kvm_destroy_vcpus() can free the vCPU before the callback enters kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_interrupt().

A guest can arm the timer with SBI TIME and request shutdown with SBI legacy shutdown or SRST. A VMM that honors KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT and destroys the VM supplies the teardown side of the race; no post-launch host ioctl is needed to arm or request teardown.

On upstream master 62cc90241548, generic KASAN reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock Write of size 4 at addr ff60000005e58898

kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_interrupt kvm_riscv_vcpu_hrtimer_expired __hrtimer_run_queues hrtimer_interrupt

The object was allocated by KVM_CREATE_VCPU and freed concurrently by:

kvm_destroy_vcpus kvm_arch_destroy_vm kvm_destroy_vm __fput

For deterministic validation, I added mdelay(1000) immediately after the existing next_set = false assignment. This only widens the existing post-clear callback window.

A no-delay trace build naturally reached the callback-after-teardown-start/before-deinit ordering in 12 of 200 runs, but 1,500 stock-kernel stress iterations did not produce a KASAN report, so natural reproduction is timing-sensitive.

Always invoke hrtimer_cancel() for an initialized timer. Preserve the existing -EINVAL result when the timer is no longer set, but only after synchronizing with a running callback.

With this patch, hrtimer_cancel() blocked for the full widened callback window before vCPU destruction. KASAN reported no error in 100 fixed-and-widened runs or 200 fix-only timing-sweep runs.

Source: NVD