Microsoft Security Response Center guidance
Vendor revision: Nov 12, 2026Release Notes
Vendor-listed releases
- 0:6.18.57-1.1.azl4
Vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-98286. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.
Release Notes
Vendor-listed releases
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown
In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(), net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set() and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync().
However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and dm_alert_work: 1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work. 2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data() or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data().
3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&data->send_timer, ...).
If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync() executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned. Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer remains active in the timer wheel.
If the module is then unloaded, the timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory, triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free.
Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding.
When monitoring is restarted later, timer_setup() is invoked, which cleanly re-initializes the timer.
Source: NVD