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CVE intelligence

CVE-2026-89732

Vulnerability intelligence

Published Sep 11, 2026Sources checked Nov 3, 2026
N/ACVSS not listedScore unavailable
What this means

Review the available evidence

CVE-2026-89732. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.

CISA KEVNot listedBased on the latest collected catalog
EPSS0.2%Estimated 30-day exploitation probability
Ransomware useNot markedCISA KEV ransomware field
Threat actors0Source-linked actor relationships
Overview

What is CVE-2026-89732?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent deadlock during ep0 read loop

Currently, ffs_ep0_read() holds ffs->mutex when it prepares to go to sleep waiting for an event. When no setup events are pending, it calls wait_event_interruptible_exclusive_locked_irq() with the mutex still held.

The wait macro deliberately drops the waitqueue spinlock before sleeping but does not drop the mutex.

If a userspace daemon is polling ep0 via read() and the gadget is asynchronously torn down via configfs (e.g., echo "" > UDC), a deadlock can occur:

1. The configfs teardown calls functionfs_unbind(), which queues a FUNCTIONFS_UNBIND event.

2. The daemon wakes up, consumes the event, and drops the mutex.

3. However, if the daemon loops and immediately issues another read() before exiting, it reacquires ffs->mutex and again goes into an interruptible sleep.

4. Meanwhile, functionfs_unbind() continues execution and attempts to acquire ffs->mutex to tear down ep0req.

5. The kernel deadlocks because the configfs thread is stuck in an uninterruptible sleep waiting for the mutex, while the userspace daemon is in an interruptible sleep holding the mutex forever because no more events will arrive.

To fix this, we drop both the waitqueue spinlock and ffs->mutex before going to sleep, and use wait_event_interruptible_exclusive() instead. Upon waking up, we jump back to the `retry` label to safely reacquire the mutex and re-evaluate the state machine.

By not sleeping with ffs->mutex held, we natively decouple gadget teardowns (which require the mutex) from userspace polling.

Source: NVD