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CVE intelligence

CVE-2026-64571

Vulnerability intelligence

Published Aug 5, 2026Sources checked Oct 28, 2026
N/ACVSS not listedScore unavailable
What this means

Review the available evidence

CVE-2026-64571. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.

What to do next

Remediation and response

Microsoft Security Response Center guidance

Vendor revision: Aug 9, 2026

CBL-Mariner Releases

Vendor-listed releases

  • 6.6.150.1-1
CISA KEVNot listedBased on the latest collected catalog
EPSS0.2%Estimated 30-day exploitation probability
Ransomware useNot markedCISA KEV ransomware field
Threat actors0Source-linked actor relationships
Overview

What is CVE-2026-64571?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()

p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds that many bytes.

Commit da1b9a55ff11 ("wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()") closed the destination overflow by copying a fixed priv->eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len), but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long enough to supply that many bytes.

A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches priv->eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ... __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005) ... </IRQ>

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff88800f0770c0, ffff88800f077380)

Check that the slice fits in the skb before copying.

Source: NVD