CVE intelligence

CVE-2026-64047

Vulnerability intelligence

Published Jul 19, 2026Sources checked Oct 27, 2026

9.8CRITICALCVSS out of 10

What this means

Review the available evidence

CVE-2026-64047 and is rated Critical severity with a CVSS score of 9.8. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.

What to do next

Remediation and response

Ubuntu Security Notices guidance

Vendor revision: Sep 29, 2026

Vendor remediation details

This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems: - ARM32 architecture; - ARM64 architecture; - PowerPC architecture; - Compute Acceleration Framework; - Drivers core; - Bluetooth drivers; - Arm Firmware Framework for ARMv8-A(FFA); - EFI core; - GPU drivers; - Hardware monitoring drivers; - InfiniBand drivers; - Network drivers; - Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA) driver; - SCSI subsystem; - SPI subsystem; - Network file systems library; - NTFS3 file system; - SMB network file system; - File systems infrastructure; - Software nodes and device properties; - Bluetooth subsystem; - Netfilter; - Tracing infrastructure; - io_uring subsystem; - IRQ subsystem; - KProbes tracing; - Memory management; - B.A.T.M.A.N.

Ubuntu Security Notices guidance

Vendor revision: Sep 25, 2026

Vendor remediation details

Ubuntu Security Notices guidance

Vendor revision: Sep 22, 2026

Vendor remediation details

CISA KEVNot listedBased on the latest collected catalog

EPSS0.5%Estimated 30-day exploitation probability

Ransomware useNot markedCISA KEV ransomware field

Threat actors0Source-linked actor relationships

Overview

What is CVE-2026-64047?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring

When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this:

struct sk_msg_sg { [...] /* The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. */ struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];

The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size:

sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start], MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1, msg_pl->sg.data);

This places the chain pointer at

sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. = &data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 = data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1] = data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]

instead of the true last entry. This is likely due to a "race" of the commit under Fixes landing close to commit 031097d9e079 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down")

Convert to ARRAY_SIZE and drop the data[start] / - start (as suggested by Sabrina).

Source: NVD