Microsoft Security Response Center guidance
Vendor revision: Jun 17, 2026CBL-Mariner Releases
Vendor-listed releases
- 6.6.141.1-1
Vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-46303 and is rated High severity with a CVSS score of 8.2. It is not in the current CISA KEV record we collected. That does not prove exploitation has not occurred.
CBL-Mariner Releases
Vendor-listed releases
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size
rock_continue() reads rs->cont_extent verbatim from the Rock Ridge CE record and passes it to sb_bread() without checking that the block number is within the mounted ISO 9660 volume. commit e595447e177b ("[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories") added cont_offset and cont_size rejection for the CE continuation but did not validate the extent block number itself. commit f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries") later capped the CE chain length at RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again left the block number unchecked.
With a crafted ISO mounted via udisks2 (desktop optical auto-mount) or via CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount, rs->cont_extent can therefore point at an out-of-range block or at blocks belonging to an adjacent filesystem on the same block device. sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the block layer EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation.
For in-range reads of adjacent- filesystem data, the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records and only the text of SL sub-records reaches userspace through readlink(), which makes the info-leak channel narrow and difficult to exploit; still, rejecting the malformed CE outright matches the rejection shape already present in the same function for cont_offset and cont_size.
Add an ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones bounds check to rock_continue() next to the existing offset/size rejection, printing the same corrupted-directory-entry notice.
Source: NVD