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Microsoft Security Response CenterCVE-2017-3736

There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure in OpenSSL before 1.0.2m and 1.1.0 before 1.1.0g. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.

Medium 1 CVE Published Apr 27, 2026 at 1:04 AM UTC

Summary

Mariner

Products covered

  • azl3 cloud-hypervisor 48.0.246-4 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • cbl2 hvloader 1.0.1-18 on CBL Mariner 2.0

  • cbl2 openssl 1.1.1k-39 on CBL Mariner 2.0

  • azl3 nodejs24 24.14.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • azl3 rust 1.75.0-27 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • azl3 edk2 20240524git3e722403cd16-16 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • azl3 openssl 3.3.5-5 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • cbl2 edk2 20230301gitf80f052277c8-47 on CBL Mariner 2.0

Show 4 more products
  • azl3 edk2 20240524git3e722403cd16-15 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • azl3 openssl 3.3.5-4 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • azl3 qemu 9.1.0-1 on Azure Linux 3.0

  • azl3 rust 1.90.0-6 on Azure Linux 3.0

Remediation

Separate remediation guidance was not included in the collected bulletin.

CVEs in this advisory 1

Updates

  1. Published by Microsoft Security Response Center

    The publication date reported by the vendor.

  2. Updated by Microsoft Security Response Center

    The vendor changed the advisory after it was first published.

  3. Added to SecurityAlert

    We collected the advisory from the official source.

  4. Confirmed at the source

    Our collector saw this advisory during a later source check.